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Today’s Congress appears to be far from the kind of robust institution that the 
Framers of the U.S. Constitution feared when they characterized the legislature 
as the most dangerous branch of government.1 Political polarization and gridlock 
have hampered Congress’s ability to act and undoubtedly contributed to the fact 
that today’s worries about the concentration and abuse of federal power usually 
center on the executive branch.2 Legal scholar Bruce Ackerman, for example, has 
decried how modern circumstances have “transformed the executive branch into a 
serious threat to our constitutional tradition.”3 Arguing that executive power 
threatens American democratic governance, scholar Peter Shane has plainly 
declared that “the President is the most dangerous branch.”4 
Such claims of excessive executive power call to mind historical examples 
of forceful exertions of presidential authority, such as when President Truman 
asserted inherent executive authority to seize and run the nation’s steel mills, 
a move the Supreme Court famously blocked in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer.5 But present-day concerns over executive power have emerged as 
more than a matter of historical interest. Contemporary scholarly voices of 
alarm join with those of political leaders from both the right and the left who, 
not surprisingly, in their turn deplore exercises of executive authority by 
administrations of their opposing parties.6 Democrats have resoundingly 
criticized President George W. Bush and his Administration’s invocation of the 
unitary executive theory, while Republican members of Congress have taken 
 
1 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all 
power into its impetuous vortex. . . . [I]t is against the enterprising ambition of this department 
that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.”). This fear of 
legislative tyranny explains why the Constitution divided the Congress into two houses, each of 
which must consent before any bill can become law. 
2 Such alarm is, of course, hardly new. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY viii (1973) (describing an increasing “conception of presidential power so spacious and 
peremptory as to imply a radical transformation of the traditional polity” and arguing that “[t]he 
constitutional Presidency . . . has become the imperial Presidency”). 
3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 4 (2010). 
4 PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 18-21 (2009). Ackerman and Shane are not alone in this regard. For 
examples of similar arguments, see Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 
1821 (1996), claiming that “the executive branch long ago supplanted its legislative counterpart as the 
most powerful—and therefore most dangerous—in the sense that the Founders meant,” and Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 
223 (1994), asserting that “[t]ruly, the executive—the Presidency—is the most dangerous branch.” 
5 See 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several 
constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President.”). 
6 See Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies: A Debate over Law or Politics?, 
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 638 (2010) (noting that “Democrats can be expected to be more critical of 
the exercise of presidential power by Republican Presidents, and vice versa”). 
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to criticizing—even suing—the Obama Administration over executive 
initiatives on policies as varied as health care, immigration, and gun control.7 
Although fierce, many recent legal controversies over executive power 
have involved what remains, at least to the larger public, a relatively obscure 
aspect of government: namely, the implementation of domestic policies by 
the many cabinet departments and other administrative agencies that carry out 
governmental functions on a day-to-day basis. This vast apparatus of the 
regulatory state, centered within the executive branch, has grown dramatically 
since the founding of the United States. Although less visible to most 
Americans than other governmental institutions like Congress or the 
presidency, federal departments and agencies wield power over vast segments 
of the economy, affecting almost every important facet of contemporary life. 
What actions these domestic agencies take and how they make their decisions 
matter greatly, making the discretion exercised by these administrative 
institutions a proper matter for both investigation and concern. 
Not only do contemporary controversies revolve around the day-to-day 
operation of the regulatory state, but they also increasingly involve still subtler 
exercises of executive discretion than (merely) deciding what policies to adopt or 
actions to take. Several important controversies in recent years center not so much 
on executive action at all—as was the case with Truman’s attempt to seize control 
of steel mills—but rather on the strategic deployment of executive inaction. When 
the Obama Administration announced in 2013 that it was effectively extending 
certain compliance deadlines under the Affordable Care Act, it did so by declaring 
that it would refrain from taking enforcement actions for the period of the 
extension.8 Similarly, when President Barack Obama announced a major 
immigration reform initiative in 2014, the centerpiece of that reform package was 
 
7  See, e.g., Ashley Parker, ‘Imperial Presidency’ Becomes a Rallying Cry for Republicans, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/us/politics/imperial-presidency-becomes-republicans-
rallying-slogan.html [https://perma.cc/FN73-DJCZ] (observing that Republicans have called President 
Obama an imperial President, “encapsulat[ing] their criticisms about government overreach” due to the 
President’s policy initiatives). Contrasting assessments by U.S. Senators from different parties are illustrative. 
Compare Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator, Warning Against the Bush Administration’s Efforts to Vastly 
Expand Executive Power (May 30, 2006), http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2006/5/5b39
1b57-7e9c-9af9-72a8-c4f965f0a085-post [https://perma.cc/XFM3-JWCD] (“[The Bush] Administration 
has, in my view, implemented a multi-pronged, ongoing effort to concentrate power under the Executive 
- contrary to our constitutional framework . . . .”), with Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented 
Lawlessness, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 99 (2015) (“There is no basis in history for [President Obama’s] 
sweeping view of executive power.”). 
8 See Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Ins. Comm’rs. (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.cms.gov
/CCIIO/Resources/Letters/Downloads/commissioner-letter-11-14-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9XL-XZ
QW] (“Under this transitional policy, health insurance coverage in the individual or small group market that 
is renewed for a policy year starting between January 1, 2014, and October 1, 2014, and associated group 
health plans of small businesses, will not be considered to be out of compliance with the market reforms 
specified below under the conditions specified below.”). 
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the Administration’s stated commitment not to enforce immigration laws against 
certain undocumented immigrants whose children are U.S. citizens or legal 
permanent residents.9 In both of these instances, the Obama Administration 
justified its policy choices at least in part on executive discretion not to pursue 
certain enforcement actions.10 
It has long been accepted that, absent any express statutory restriction to 
the contrary, the executive branch possesses broad discretion over which cases 
it prosecutes and which ones it does not.11 Legal restrictions on executive 
authority have typically applied only after the executive branch has decided 
to act, not before it acts. Before any final action occurs, the executive branch 
possesses what the Supreme Court has recognized as an “absolute discretion,” 
at least when it comes to enforcement.12 Yet today, the absoluteness of that 
discretion is being put up for debate. As Presidents and their appointees 
increasingly find more creative ways to achieve substantive policy results 
through what have previously been considered completely discretionary 
means, it becomes understandable that scholars, governmental leaders, and 
 
9 See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Immigration 
Accountability Executive Action (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20
/fact-sheet-immigration-accountability-executive-action [https://perma.cc/3VJ5-YTR7] (“DHS will also 
create a new deferred action program for people who are parents of U.S. Citizens or Lawful Permanent 
Residents (LPRs) and have lived in the United States for five years or longer if they register, pass a 
background check and pay taxes.”). 
10 On the ACA, see Greg Sargent, White House Defends Legality of Obamacare Fix, WASH. 
POST: PLUM LINE (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013
/11/14/white-house-defends-legality-of-obamacare-fix [https://perma.cc/P82F-3QAU], which quoted 
the Obama Administration’s response that “[t]he Supreme Court held more than 25 years ago that 
agencies charged with administering statues [sic] have inherent authority to exercise discretion to 
ensure that their statutes are enforced in a manner that achieves statutory goals and are consistent with 
other administrative policies.” On immigration, see Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files
/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4858-KALY], which stated that 
“[d]eferred action is a form of prosecutorial discretion by which the Secretary deprioritizes an 
individual’s case for humanitarian reasons, administrative convenience, or in the interest of the 
Department’s overall enforcement mission.” 
11 On occasion, Presidents have even challenged provisions of statutes mandating enforcement as 
unconstitutional infringements on their enforcement discretion. See Statement on Signing the 
Immigration Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1717, 1718 (Nov. 29, 1990) (“I do not interpret this provision 
[on “temporary protected status”] as detracting from any authority of the executive branch to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion in suitable immigration cases. Any attempt to do so would raise serious 
constitutional questions.”); Statement on Signing the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, 
1 PUB. PAPERS 802, 803 (June 19, 1986) (“The principle of prosecutorial discretion is an essential 
ingredient in the execution of the laws. I believe that the Congress cannot bind the Executive in advance 
and remove all prosecutorial discretion without infringing on the powers of the Executive.”). 
12 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court has recognized on several 
occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through 
civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”). 
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the public are beginning to wonder about whether there should be any limits 
on this approach to the exercise of executive power. It was not very surprising 
that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a district court 
injunction blocking the Obama Administration’s immigration policy.13 But it 
was telling that the Court, on its own accord, added to the questions raised 
by the parties a constitutional question involving the duty of a President to 
take care that federal laws are faithfully executed.14 
Although the Court ultimately declined to answer any of the questions raised 
in that case,15 the central question remains: what are the proper bounds of 
executive discretion in the regulatory state, especially over administrative 
decisions not to take enforcement actions? This question, which, just by asking 
it, would seem to cast into some doubt the seemingly absolute discretion the 
executive branch has until now been thought to possess, has become the focal 
point of the latest debate to emerge over the U.S. Constitution’s separation of 
powers. That ever-growing, heated debate is what motivated more than two 
dozen distinguished scholars to gather for a two-day conference held late last year 
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, a conference organized around the 
papers appearing in this special Issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review. We are pleased to introduce this insightful collection of scholarship by 
explicating the conceptual contours underlying the contemporary debate over 
executive discretion, and its bounds, in the regulatory state. 
I. THE FACES OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION 
To begin to understand how executive discretion is or should be bounded, it 
helps to define what “executive discretion” means. We take “discretion” plainly to 
mean the unconstrained exercise of governmental power. We take “executive” to 
encompass not only the President but also the White House staff as well as the 
appointees and other officers who serve within the administrative agencies that 
carry out the laws adopted by Congress. To ask about the bounds of executive 
discretion, then, is to ask about how much unconstrained power the President and 
administrative officials should possess. In this introductory Article, we do not offer 
answers to that question, for, broadly speaking, that question is what the articles 
that follow in this Symposium seek to address. Here, we simply note that what 
bounds are, or should be, placed on executive discretion will likely depend on the 
type of power under consideration. 
 
13 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906, 906 (2016). 
14 See id. (“In addition to the questions presented by the petition, the parties are directed to 
brief and argue the following question: ‘Whether the Guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the 
Constitution, Art. II, § 3.’”). 
15 The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision in a per curiam ruling with an evenly split 
Court. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam). 
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A. Three Faces of Executive Power 
Political scientists have long grappled with the meaning of power, and, over 
forty years ago, political theorist Steven Lukes offered a significant advance by 
articulating what have come to be known as the three faces of power.16 Greatly 
simplifying, these three faces comprise the powers to make decisions, set agendas, 
and shape preferences.17 Lukes’s framework conceptualizes power within any 
social and political arena, including government. 
Without denying the value of Lukes’s framework as a matter of sociology, 
we think that, from the standpoint of constitutional and administrative law, 
it is helpful to recognize three slightly different ways of conceiving of the 
faces of executive power: the power to command, persuade, and defer. These 
three faces of executive power are not incompatible with Lukes’s framework, 
but they serve to illuminate key questions about how (or by how much) each 
type of executive power should be constrained by law. 
The first face of executive power is the power to command. For most 
readers, this will be the kind of power that most naturally springs to mind 
when thinking about executive discretion. It is also very closely related to 
Lukes’s first face of power of decisionmaking. The power to command is the 
power, as political scientist Robert Dahl once wrote, to compel people to do 
what they “would not otherwise do.”18 Truman’s executive order seeking to 
seize control of the nation’s steel mills is a paradigmatic example of the power 
to command. It is a power that compels action, invoked any time government 
adopts an order or a rule.19 
Well-accepted principles of U.S. constitutional and administrative law treat 
this type of power most suspiciously, making it more likely to be subject to 
judicial review than any other type of executive power. The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,20 blocking President 
Truman’s steel seizure order, makes plain that presidential action of this first 
type must be grounded in law and will be scrutinized by the courts. As Justice 
Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown makes clear, when a 
President acts in contravention of a statute, “his power is at its lowest ebb.”21 
Likewise, when an administrative agency exercises its power to command, 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) affords anyone adversely affected an 
 
16 See generally STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974). 
17 Id. at 32. 
18 Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 202-03 (1957). 
19 See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012) (defining “agency action” 
to mean the adoption of a “rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent”). 
20 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
21 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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opportunity to seek judicial review of the agency’s action.22 The courts can hold 
invalid agency actions that offend constitutional or statutory requirements, fail to 
derive from proper procedure, or are determined to be “arbitrary” or “capricious.”23 
The second face of executive power is the power to persuade. Chief Justice 
John Roberts had this type of power in mind when, writing in his majority 
opinion in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, he 
castigated Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissenting opinion for essentially 
relegating the President to a position of “cajoler-in-chief.”24 But at least as far 
back as the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, with his popularization of the 
bully pulpit, the President’s power to cajole has been well-established and 
acknowledged to be influential. As a matter of real impact, persuasion may 
well be the President’s most important, if not only, real source of power for 
most purposes. Political scientist Richard Neustadt thought as much, defining 
presidential power explicitly in terms of the power of persuasion.25 Although 
Chief Justice Roberts seemed to suggest that cajoling diminished the office 
of the presidency, Presidents actually have a distinctive capacity to persuade 
others, particularly when it comes to what issues should be on the broader 
policy agenda. As political scientist John Kingdon has noted, “[T]he president 
can single-handedly set the agendas, not only of people in the executive branch, 
but also of people in Congress and outside the government.”26 Despite this 
substantial and practically important type of power, the power to persuade, 
unlike the power to command, is not constrained by law in any meaningful way.27 
 
22 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action . . . is 
entitled to judicial review thereof.”). 
23 Id. § 706. 
24 561 U.S. 477, 501-02 (2010). 
25 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS 30 (Free 
Press 1991) (1960). Joining him in this view is political scientist Clinton Rossiter, who recognized, though, that 
persuasion is not always easy, even for a President. See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
41 (1956) (positing that the President’s most difficult challenge stems from the need “to persuade the pertinent 
bureau or agency—even when headed by men of his own choosing—to follow his direction faithfully”). 
26 JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 23 (updated 2d 
ed. 2011). For a discussion of presidential influence over the rulemaking agendas at administrative 
agencies, see Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory State: Theory and 
Evidence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 93 (2016).  
27 We recognize, of course, that regulatory agencies can try to use the power to persuade as a 
strategy for shaping behavior and will be subject to legal constraints when they do so. See, e.g., 
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 255 (2008) (making a case for the use of “the 
gentle nudge” as a means of accomplishing regulatory goals). Whether in adopting default rules or 
information disclosure regulations, agencies are still actually exercising a power to command 
regulated entities to act in certain ways; they are just, for example, requiring these entities to disclose 
information with the aim of activating third parties who will persuade the disclosers to change other 
behavior. See id. at 190-92 (describing a requirement that companies disclose their releases of toxic 
chemicals, creating “bad publicity” that motivates companies to reduce their pollution). As such, regulatory 
nudges will be constrained in much the same way as other regulatory commands. They must be consistent 
with legal authority, promulgated through proper procedure, and grounded in sound policy reasoning. 
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The third face of executive power is the power to defer. This type of power 
involves the use of inaction as a lever to achieve policy outcomes. It is this 
face of power that underlies several of the most recent controversies over 
executive power. When the Obama Administration announced that it would 
not enforce certain employer deadlines in the Affordable Care Act, and when 
it announced that it would refrain from taking immigration action against 
certain undocumented immigrants, it asserted its power to defer.28 Although 
these current uses of the power to defer have stirred much controversy, the 
governmental power to defer has been around for a long time and is especially 
prevalent in the context of law’s enforcement.29 Prosecutorial discretion is a 
paradigmatic example. The power lies not merely in prosecutors’ freedom to 
defer pressing charges, but also in the way that discretion affords prosecutors 
considerable influence over defendants. By using their discretion over what 
charges to file as a bargaining chip, prosecutors can lead many defendants to 
waive their right to a jury trial and plead guilty. 
In the regulatory state, an administrative agency’s power to defer can 
sometimes have a similar “bargaining chip” effect. By steering enforcement 
resources toward certain kinds of behavior and away from others, agencies 
have sometimes tried to use their power to defer in an attempt to shape 
private conduct. In the 1990s, for example, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) announced a policy according to which the 
Agency would allow regulated firms to “choose” the level of scrutiny that 
OSHA would apply to them.30 If a company cooperated and put in place a 
health and safety management system (which was not something required by 
law), OSHA would place the company on a low-priority status for 
inspection.31 If a company did not cooperate by putting in place OSHA’s 
 
28 See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
29 It is not only present in the enforcement context, of course. When a statute delegates broad 
rulemaking authority but offers little direction as to when or how an agency must use that 
rulemaking authority, the agency will also be able to exercise its power to defer. It should also be 
acknowledged that other branches of government have the power to defer, as well. The Supreme 
Court, for example, can defer granting petitions for certiorari on important issues until the Justices 
believe they have a case that frames issues productively. See, e.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO 
DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 236 (1991) (“When assessing 
whether or not a case is a good vehicle, the decision must be made in terms of ‘is a better case likely?’”). 
30 See Occupational Safety and Health Administration Directive CPL 02-00-119, OSHA High 
Injury/Illness Rate Targeting and Cooperative Compliance Programs (Dep’t of Labor 1997), 
https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_id=1516&p_table=DIRECTIVES 
[https://perma.cc/PX9L-VZ8V] [hereinafter “OSHA Directive”] (detailing the agency’s “Cooperative 
Compliance Program” under which facilities that “choose to participate” will be placed on secondary or 
tertiary inspection lists that reduce their chances of inspection by at least seventy to ninety percent). For 
further background on this “choose your OSHA” approach, see John D. Donahue, The Unaccustomed 
Inventiveness of the Labor Department, in INNOVATIONS IN GOVERNMENT: RESEARCH, RECOGNITION, 
AND REPLICATION 93, 96 (Sandford Borins ed., 2008). 
31 OSHA Directive, supra note 30. 
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desired management system, then the Agency assured the company of a high 
likelihood of receiving an inspection, and presumably a very rigorous one at 
that.32 OSHA claimed merely to be exercising its power to defer, its discretion 
over when and who to inspect, but a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit rejected that position.33 According to the court, OSHA’s policy 
was more than just an internal “inspection plan”; it actually amounted to a new 
regulation, and thus the agency needed to go through a full notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedure.34 
Although the court rejected OSHA’s attempt to use its power to defer to 
achieve the Agency’s strategic goals, in most circumstances agency decisions 
to defer on inspections or enforcement actions have been left entirely 
unconstrained. In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court rejected a statutory 
challenge to the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) decision to decline 
to take enforcement action against state correctional facilities that were 
administering the death penalty through lethal injection.35 The federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) gives the FDA the authority to enforce its 
many provisions, which include a requirement that drugs be approved as “safe 
and effective” before they can be lawfully administered.36 Even though it 
seemed facially obvious that the use of drugs for lethal injections violated the 
FDCA, the Court refused to order the FDA to take any enforcement action 
against the states. The Court held that, in cases of agency “[r]efusals to take 
enforcement steps,” “the presumption is that judicial review is not 
available.”37 The Court reasoned that setting enforcement priorities were 
policy choices, not legal ones: 
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of 
a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency 
must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency 
resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is 
likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested 
best fits the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has 
enough resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot act 
against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The 
 
32 Id. 
33 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 211-13 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
34 Id. at 212-13. 
35 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985). 
36 Id. at 824. 
37 Id. at 831. The Court noted that the APA, 5 U.S.C. §701(a)(2), does not afford judicial review 
to actions that are “committed to agency discretion” by law. Id. at 832. 
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agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables 
involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.38 
Furthermore, the Court noted that decisions not to act do not usually amount 
to an exertion of “coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property 
rights,” which would present the kinds of issues that courts typically seek to 
protect.39 
Although the Heckler Court unanimously concluded that the APA did not 
authorize the courts to compel FDA enforcement, it did acknowledge that 
agencies cannot decline to take enforcement actions if doing so would 
contravene statutory guidelines. “Congress may limit an agency’s exercise of 
enforcement power if it wishes,” the Court noted, “either by setting 
substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency’s power to 
discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.”40 Furthermore, as Cass 
Sunstein has argued, it appears that Heckler “does not authorize the executive 
to fail to enforce those laws of which it disapproves.”41 But exactly how to 
determine whether decisions to defer are based on mere disapproval will not 
always be clear, something even Sunstein has acknowledged.42 At present, what 
does seem quite clear is that Heckler gives government agencies a strong 
presumption of absolute discretion whenever they exercise their power to defer. 
Looking across all three faces of executive power—command, persuade, 
and defer—it is possible to say that these powers correspond to three degrees 
or levels of legal constraint. The power to command faces the greatest 
constraint and oversight by the courts. Youngstown teaches that when 
commanding, the President must possess authority to do so and must not act 
in opposition to legislative principles. The APA makes plain that when 
agencies issue orders or rules, those who are adversely affected by them may 
seek to review the substantive and procedural legality of those actions. By 
contrast, the power to persuade faces the least amount of constraint—basically 
none at all. Somewhere in between, but usually close to the “no constraint 
whatsoever” end of the spectrum, lies the power to defer, at least absent any 
specific guidelines for action contained within an applicable statute. 
 
38 Id. at 831-32. 
39 Id. at 832. 
40 Id. at 833. 
41 Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
653, 670 (1985). 
42 Id. at 672-73. 
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B. Executive Discretion: Presidential and Administrative 
Just as distinguishing the three faces of executive power helps to clarify the 
bounds of executive discretion in the regulatory state, it can also prove helpful 
to distinguish between two main components of “executive” in the concept of 
executive discretion: Presidents versus the administrators they appoint to head 
administrative agencies. Obviously Presidents spring immediately to mind in 
any consideration of executive power; after all, Article II of the Constitution 
declares that “[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President.”43 Yet under 
most statutes, Congress has delegated authority to administrators; they are the 
officials granted the express powers to command or defer in ways that carry out 
the aims and responsibilities contained in specific legislation. These powers, 
exercised ultimately by administrators, are the ones that give rise to the kinds 
of questions about the bounds of executive discretion that are addressed 
throughout this Symposium. 
Let us return to the example of the Department of Labor’s choose-your-OSHA 
policy from the 1990s. That enforcement policy came about following a public 
announcement by President William Clinton of a “New OSHA” initiative, 
under which the agency would adopt smarter approaches to reducing 
workplace injuries, including the choose-your-OSHA compliance policy.44 
Vice President Albert Gore even presented OSHA with an award for a regional 
prototype of the policy as part of a White House–driven initiative, called the 
National Performance Review, which sought to encourage agencies to pursue 
innovative regulatory strategies.45 Yet despite these White House efforts, the 
policy was formally adopted by the Department of Labor, and it was the 
Secretary of Labor who was named in the D.C. Circuit litigation over the policy. 
For similar reasons, even though President Obama may have announced his 
Administration’s actions to delay the compliance period for mandated health 
insurance and to defer taking deportation actions against certain undocumented 
immigrants, these actions were legally effectuated by the Administrators heading 
the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Homeland Security, 
respectively. 
Distinguishing between the President, who possesses “the executive 
power” under Article II, and a series of administrators, who are granted 
delegated authority to act by statute, proves to be crucial to understanding 
 
43 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
44  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, OSHA Expands Cooperative Compliance Programs to 
Reduce Injuries and Illnesses in the Workplace (Nov. 25, 1997), https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp
.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=1075 [https://perma.cc/TJ4C-VVWS] (“CCPs are 
part of the new, common-sense approach to OSHA announced by President Clinton in May 1995.”). 
45 Id. 
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the broader debate over the unitary executive.46 On the one hand, we can ask 
whether the statutory grant of authority to a specific administrator implies 
some limitation on presidential involvement in the actions undertaken by that 
administrator. On the other hand, is a statutory grant to an administrator still 
subject to the Constitution’s vesting of executive power in “a” President? 
These questions have been debated throughout the nation’s history and 
examined extensively in constitutional scholarship.47 We thus do little here 
beyond noting these larger questions, although they do turn out to be relevant 
to much of the discussion in this Symposium, even if they are only lurking in 
the background at times. The key point for our purposes here is simply that 
the statutorily authorized, as well as practically vital, role for administrators 
in executive governance also helps to explain why so much constitutional law 
involving the separation of powers has centered on the President’s 
relationship to administrators, particularly with respect to the President’s 
authority to appoint and remove those administrators.48 
The distinction between Presidents and administrators also lies at the 
heart of the Take Care Clause, which several of the contributors to this 
Symposium analyze in detail. This clause may well constrain executive power 
to defer, imposing an obligation to enforce laws “faithfully,” as perhaps hinted 
by the Supreme Court when it added the Take Care Clause question to its 
grant of review of the Obama Administration’s immigration deferred action 
program.49 Without a doubt, the clause speaks to the President, imploring 
that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”50 As Professor 
Sunstein has written, this provision articulates a clear “duty” and “imposes 
an obligation on the President.”51 
But recognizing that the clause imposes some duty on the President does 
not make clear what bounds might exist on executive discretion to defer. 
Instead, it raises two further questions. First, what exactly is the duty 
imposed by the clause? Surely it is not for the President directly to enforce 
 
46 See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 3-4 
(2008) (“[T]he theory of the unitary executive holds that the Vesting Clause of Article II . . . is a grant 
to the president of all of the executive power, which includes the power to remove and direct all lower-
level executive officials.”) 
47 See id. at 3-21 (reviewing the debate in constitutional scholarship over the President’s authority 
over subordinate executive officials). See generally id. (tracing historical claims surrounding Presidents’ 
assertion of authority over executive officials). 
48 For seminal cases on the President’s relationship to agency administrators, see NLRB v. Noel 
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014); Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 
477 (2010); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 
(1935); and Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
49 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906, 906 (2016). 
50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). 
51 Sunstein, supra note 41, at 670. 
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the law, but rather, as the text of the provision makes plain, it is for the 
President to see that the law is faithfully executed by others—namely, by the 
administrators who are given statutory authority to implement and enforce. 
Second, what duty, if any, does the clause impose on those administrators 
themselves? The text of the Take Care Clause would seem plainly to impose 
its obligation on the President, not on the administrators. 
Yet can it really be the case that the President has a constitutional duty to 
see that the laws are faithfully executed, but that administrators have no 
similar constitutional obligation to execute laws, faithfully or otherwise? 
Answering this question about the Take Care Clause brings us back to the 
debate over the unitary executive theory.52 It also brings us back to the three 
faces of executive power.53 
Asking whether the Take Care Clause imposes obligations on 
administrators, either directly or indirectly, contemplates a scenario much 
like that raised by the Obama Administration’s deferred action immigration 
plan, where an Administrator sought to exercise the power to defer.54 
Admittedly, the President happened to agree with the Administrator—and, 
in fact, the Administrator may even have been directed by the President to 
implement the deferred action program. But for sake of analysis, let us vary 
the scenario slightly to imagine a President who does not support an 
administrator’s exercise of the power to defer. Does the President have the 
power to command that the administrator no longer defer? If so, and if the 
administrator has a duty to obey the President’s command, then the duty that 
the Take Care Clause imposes on the President can effectively be transferred 
to the administrator by the use of a presidential order. 
Of course, some scholars will no doubt still be inclined to argue that the 
President has no directive authority that can impose a duty to execute on the 
administrator. Any such duty, they would argue, would need to be imposed 
by Congress, especially given that the Supreme Court in Heckler has 
acknowledged that Congress can impose that duty. As for the President, if 
he possesses no directive authority over his administrators, then he must 
seek to fulfill his constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully 
executed by exercising his power to persuade, a power which presumably can 
be made stronger by also making threats to exercise his authority to remove 
a recalcitrant administrator. 
 
52 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 46. 
53 See supra Section I.A. 
54 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE BOUNDS OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION 
Up to this point in this introduction, our aim has been to provide some 
conceptual order to illuminate and organize the underlying legal issues 
implicated by recent controversies over the use of executive power. We have 
argued that any analysis of the bounds of executive discretion in the 
regulatory state should begin by distinguishing between the type of executive 
power exercised as well as the executive actor under scrutiny, the President 
versus administrator. The discretion by an administrator not to act ought to 
be distinguished from that same administrator’s discretion over what actions 
to take—as well as from the discretion inherent in the President’s exercise of 
executive power. With Heckler as the principal foundation, we have argued 
that an administrator’s power to defer has virtually no legal bounds on it at 
all—at least (a) without some statutory compulsion or guidelines, or (b) 
absent (i) a relevant presidential order, and (ii) an obligation on the part of 
the administrator to follow the President’s order. 
As should be clear, this framework still leaves much to be worked out, not 
the least of which will be some of the persistent points of debate over 
separation-of-powers law, such as the question of an administrator’s duty to 
obey presidential orders. Still, we offer the framework here to help clarify the 
importance of the scholarship presented in this Symposium. Discerning the 
bounds of executive discretion in the regulatory state, as we hope should by 
now be evident, requires attention to the proper scope of executive power in 
U.S. constitutional governance, consideration of special concerns about the 
use of executive discretion to defer administrative action, and an assessment 
of possible doctrinal and nondoctrinal bounds on that discretion to defer. In 
this Section, we briefly introduce the articles that follow in this Symposium 
and explain how they contribute to a better understanding of the vital issues 
implicated by executive discretion and its limits. 
A. The Scope of Executive Power 
The first three articles in this Symposium examine a baseline question of 
whether the executive branch wields too much power. In his article drawing 
on his keynote address at the University of Pennsylvania Law School 
conference, Professor Cass Sunstein argues that, when compared with the 
legislative and judicial branches, the executive branch possesses a superior 
ability to gather and process information.55 Drawing on a case study of a 
Department of Transportation rule that requires automobile manufacturers 
 
55 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1613 (2016) 
(“With respect to the acquisition of information, the executive branch is usually in a far better 
position than the legislative and judicial branches.”). 
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to install backup cameras in cars, he contends that the power exercised by the 
executive branch generally makes for better regulatory decisions. As a result, 
Sunstein suggests that courts should keep from constraining executive discretion 
too severely and even apply a more deferential standard of review when reviewing 
agency interpretations of their own regulations.56 
Professor Michael Gerhardt expresses some skepticism that the legislative 
branch is as deficient as Sunstein argues; however, even accepting that the 
executive branch has a greater informational advantage, Gerhardt calls attention 
to what he considers an inherent tendency of the presidency to aggrandize its 
powers, making it the branch most prone to “constitutional arrogance.”57 
Gerhardt suggests that the legislative and judicial branches can check the 
aggrandizement of presidential power to some extent, as can public opinion. But 
he concludes with a degree of pessimism about the effectiveness of these checks—
particularly public opinion—especially when low-salience issues are involved.58 
Professor Eric Posner suggests that framing the issue as one of striking 
the proper balance between executive and legislative power focuses attention 
on the wrong question.59 Posner argues that decisions about the propriety of 
executive and legislative action should draw guidance from a more direct 
analysis of the government’s optimal structure rather than a comparison of 
the relative strength of the various branches.60 The question of how “much” 
executive power should be constrained, in other words, cannot be answered 
in the abstract. Similarly, given the dynamic interaction that necessarily exists 
between the branches of government, it is difficult to forecast how any change 
to a single structural rule will affect the relative power of any branch. 
B. Executive Power to Defer 
The next three articles analyze specific exercises of executive discretion: the 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act; the Obama Administration’s 
 
56 See id. at 1629 (“An appreciation of the epistemic advantages of the executive branch, and 
the relevance of those advantages to the ascertainment of meaning in the face of genuine ambiguity, 
strongly suggests that Auer is entirely right.”). 
57 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Arrogance, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2016) 
(explaining that Presidents display “constitutional arrogance” by “using their unilateral powers to 
break boundaries and displace other constitutional authorities”). 
58 See id. at 1657, 1669 (observing that “it is common for Presidents to bypass Congress” and 
that “[t]he courts generally—and the Supreme Court in particular—defer to administrative agencies 
and uphold executive actions more often than not” (footnote omitted)). 
59 Eric A. Posner, Balance-of-Powers Arguments, the Structural Constitution, and the Problem of 
Executive “Underenforcement,” 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1677, 1680 (2016) (noting “the difficulty of defining 
and measuring power, let alone determining whether the power of different branches ‘balances’”). 
60 See id. at 1682 (positing that, instead of seeking to balance power between the Executive and 
Congress, “[a] more promising approach is for the judicial department to address directly the social 
costs and benefits of proposed changes to government structure that end up in court”). 
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immigration reform; and the use of presidential signing statements. Each of 
these examples focuses on the use of nonenforcement discretion—or the 
power to defer—to achieve policy objectives. 
Professor Nicholas Bagley discusses the Obama Administration’s use of 
executive discretion in implementing the Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
exhaustively assessing the legality of a variety of executive actions that have 
generated criticism. Although he finds the Obama Administration mostly 
acted lawfully in implementing the ACA, he does question the legality of the 
Administration’s announcement that it would temporarily decline to enforce 
certain statutory deadlines and would reallocate certain appropriations to 
ensure the ACA could be rolled out.61 Bagley acknowledges that the 
Administration may have thought these actions were justifiable as a matter of 
policy or politics, but he warns that the long-term adverse consequences of 
the steps the Administration took may outweigh the short-term benefits.62 
Professor Patricia Bellia uses the Take Care Clause to analyze the Obama 
Administration’s attempt to frame its decision not to enforce the immigration 
laws against certain types of people as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.63 
Bellia notes that the Take Care Clause cuts both ways in terms of discretion, 
recognizing that Presidents possess discretion in how the law is enforced, 
while simultaneously obligating them to execute the law in a faithful 
manner.64 Her review of the existing judicial precedents, as well as the 
opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel on the legality of the Obama 
Administration’s immigration initiative, indicates that answers to the key 
questions remain unsettled.65 
Professor Christopher Yoo examines another form of executive discretion 
that has proven increasingly controversial: the presidential signing 
 
61 See Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1715, 1721-25, 1729-35 (2016) (noting legal issues pertaining to “administrative delays” and “cost-
sharing subsidies”). 
62 See id. at 1746-47 (“The price of such self-help, however, is likely to be paid in the further 
accretion of executive power, in the setting of precedents that make it easier for future Presidents 
to sidestep legal constraints, and in the tit-for-tat escalation of interbranch conflict.”). 
63 See Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753, 
1756 (2016) (“This Article uses DAPA to explore the tension between the discretion-granting and 
discretion-limiting features of the Faithful Execution Clause.”). 
64 See id. (arguing that “the clause seemingly embeds some flexibility to decide when and how 
to exercise that power,” but also that “the clause calls for the President not merely to ensure that the 
laws be executed, but that they be ‘faithfully’ executed”). 
65 See id. at 1791 (contending that “[t]he OLC framework appears to collapse [statutory and 
constitutional] inquiries,” and that therefore its framework “may introduce too much elasticity into 
the analysis”). 
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statement.66 If viewed as a prospective statement of how a statute will and will 
not be enforced, signing statements can be seen as a form of nonenforcement 
discretion.67 Yoo argues that signing statements raising constitutional objections 
are implicit both in Marbury v. Madison68 as well as in the longstanding tradition 
of permitting Presidents not to defend the constitutionality of every statute.69 
Signing statements about the interpretation of statutes, Yoo urges, should be 
governed by an equal dignity principle, which holds that presidential and 
congressional legislative history should receive equal treatment, either by 
ignoring both or giving each equal weight.70 
C. Assessing Possible Bounds 
The articles in the final part of this Symposium offer careful consideration 
of the potential bounds on executive discretion in the regulatory state. 
Professors Jack Goldsmith and John Manning augment Professor Bellia’s 
discussion of the ways that the Take Care Clause both recognizes and limits 
presidential discretion by considering still three additional ways: supporting 
the President’s power to remove subordinate executive officers; limiting courts’ 
authority to second-guess Presidents’ enforcement discretion; and serving as 
the textual basis for what Henry Monaghan called the “protective power”71 (and 
what Manning and Goldsmith have elsewhere called the “completion 
power”72). Manning and Goldsmith argue that, to date, the courts have not 
 
66 Christopher S. Yoo, Presidential Signing Statements: A New Perspective, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
1801, 1802-04 (2016) (observing that both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama 
have been criticized for using signing statements). 
67 See Developments in the Law—Presidential Authority, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2068, 2072, 2077 n.67 
(2012) (explaining that signing statements have been used to advance various goals within the executive 
branch, including “communicating (and at times expanding) presidential nonenforcement authority”). 
68 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
69 See Yoo, supra note 66, at 1809-12 (exploring the sources that establish presidential “authority 
and obligation” to evaluate the constitutionality of statutes). 
70 See id. at 1823 (“Treating all three actors specified in Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, with equal 
dignity requires giving equal weight to their pronouncements of the meaning of a statute. The fact that 
Presidents are essential actors in the legislative process provides strong reason to give as much weight 
to their views of the meaning of a statute as to the views of the House or the Senate.”). 
71 See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 61 (1993) 
(describing the “protective” power of the Executive as the “power to preserve, protect, and defend the 
personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the national government”). 
72 See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 
2282 (2006) (defining “completion power” as “the President’s authority to prescribe incidental details 
needed to carry into execution a legislative scheme, even in the absence of any congressional 
authorization to complete that scheme”). 
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recognized the tension between these purposes and consequently have yet to 
provide any clear guidance as to the Take Care Clause’s meaning.73 
Professor Cary Coglianese and Kristin Firth focus on the central 
relationship embedded in the Take Care Clause, namely the relationship 
between the President and the heads of administrative agencies.74 Starting 
with the assumption that the ultimate actor in implementing domestic policy 
is the agency head, they offer an analysis of possible constitutional constraints 
on the President’s ability to direct the actions those officials take (including 
strategic forms of inaction).75 Drawing on a series of original survey-based 
experiments, they assess how different norms that might constrain presidential 
involvement may affect public perceptions about the legitimacy of the law and 
legal institutions. One such possible constraint would permit Presidents to 
oversee agencies but not to make decisions for them.76 Coglianese and Firth 
find that this loose formulation leads to a decline in public legitimacy relative 
to a constraint based on a clear, bright-line test that demands that heads of 
agencies formally sign off on agency action.77 They also find evidence 
indicating that, regardless of whether the White House oversees or decides 
administrative matters, Presidents stand to take the political blame for those 
actions when something goes wrong. 
Daniel Walters moves from a focus on constitutional constraints to the 
realm of statutory law, paying careful attention to the ways that the APA’s 
procedural protections and prohibition on arbitrary and capricious agency 
conduct can be used to cabin executive discretion.78 He argues that any means 
of limiting the Executive’s enforcement discretion must grapple with the 
ubiquity of instances of nonenforcement and the accompanying strains on 
judicial capacity that a constitutional cause of action would impose. Walters 
 
73 See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
1835, 1863-66 (2016) (describing, for instance, the tension between prosecutorial discretion and the 
hesitation towards dispensation that are both read into the clause). 
74 Cary Coglianese & Kristin Firth, Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry into 
Norms About Executive Power, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1869 (2016). 
75 Id. at 1872-73 (investigating “legal limits on a President’s role in shaping action or inaction 
by executive branch officials appointed to lead administrative agencies,” limits that take “the form 
of either standards or rules”). 
76 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-
Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 966 (2001) (arguing that Presidents may influence agencies but 
not “dictate substantive decisions”); Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The 
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704-05 (2007) (urging that the 
President is an overseer rather than the decider of actions taken by administrative agencies). 
77 See Coglianese & Firth, supra note 74, at 1903-05 (finding that Presidents are seen as 
responsible by the public as soon as they become involved, even in an overseer capacity). 
78 See Daniel E. Walters, The Judicial Role in Constraining Presidential Nonenforcement Discretion: 
The Virtues of an APA Approach, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1911, 1915 (2016) (explaining how courts “‘translate’ 
constitutional values” through APA review and thus can check executive discretion (footnote omitted)). 
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advances review under the APA as a more promising basis for limiting the 
use of enforcement inaction than the Take Care Clause.79 Although “arbitrary 
and capricious” review is complex, its complexity constitutes its chief virtue, 
according to Walters, as it creates jurisdictional safety valves for the courts in 
a manner similar to Alexander Bickel’s passive virtues.80 Furthermore, the 
ambiguity in practice between agency action and inaction, along with varying 
levels of deference as well as the existence of threshold criteria, such as 
finality, give the courts the latitude to constrain severely problematic conduct 
but to avoid cases that would strain judicial capacity.81 
Finally, Professor Adrian Vermeule moves beyond both constitutional and 
statutory law to explore the possibility of conventions, or unwritten norms 
that are widely regarded as obligatory, as an important source of constraint 
on executive discretion.82 Conventions, he argues, constitute a third way of 
constraining executive discretion, beyond the use of law or the inherent 
constraints provided by politics.83 Law, politics, and conventions may also at 
times reinforce each other. Vermeule offers several prominent examples of 
conventions as constraints, including those demarcating the independence of 
certain governmental actors, such as Commissioners of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Chair of the Federal Reserve Bank, U.S. 
Attorneys, the Office of Legal Counsel, and the OIRA Administrator, as well 
as limits on the President’s power to direct the decisions of lower executive 
officials, particularly those playing adjudicatory roles.84 
III. THE FUTURE OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION 
Both collectively and individually, the articles assembled in this 
Symposium offer important new insights about the scope of executive 
discretion in the regulatory state and the potential legal avenues for ensuring 
that executive power remains properly constrained. We predict that the ideas 
presented and analyzed in this Issue will resonate long into the future because 
neither presidential power nor the regulatory functions of the federal 
government are likely to recede. Furthermore, the public is likely to continue 
to hold Presidents responsible for actions taken by officials exercising 
 
79  See id. at 1916 (discussing the value of final agency action as a backstop for courts 
unavailable through a freestanding Take Care Clause analysis). 
80 See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive 
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) (discussing discretion to decline to exercise judicial authority). 
81 See Walters, supra note 78, at 1916 (“Allowing courts to selectively review presidential 
nonenforcement discretion in turn enables them to carry more authority when they do intervene.”). 
82 See Adrian Vermeule, The Third Bound, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1949, 1949 (2016) (explaining 
conventions as being “roughly understood as unwritten but obligatory rules of the political game”). 
83 Id. at 1954-56. 
84 See id. at 1950-53 (using these situations as examples). 
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executive discretion. This will mean that Presidents continue to have, in 
addition to policy motivations for managing the regulatory state, ongoing 
political incentives to pay a considerable amount of attention to both 
administrative action and inaction.85 
As has been the case in the last several presidential campaigns, we can 
expect that, every four years, elections will afford an opportunity for national 
deliberation about executive power. Both Democratic and Republican 
presidential challengers will no doubt continue to criticize the occupants of 
the White House office they seek for abusing their influence over the 
regulatory state. Although such partisan charges about presidential overreach 
can be expected to continue, there will also always remain a difference 
between campaigning and governing. Once successful presidential candidates 
assume office, they will continue to find that they face demands they could 
never anticipate, and they will then have two basic avenues for meeting those 
demands: one avenue will require that Congress adopt new legislation for the 
bureaucracy to implement, while the other avenue will involve the bureaucracy 
alone, acting on authority already granted to it under existing legislation. 
With either avenue, the basic motivations for the exercise of executive 
power to command, persuade, or defer will continue to persist. The exigencies 
of the nation will call for responses by both Presidents and the government’s 
chief administrators. How these officials exercise their executive discretion, 
and whether they use it to take action or to deploy strategic inaction, will 
undoubtedly determine whether the government succeeds in fulfilling its 
responsibility to the public—or whether it fails or, worse still, abuses its 
discretion. What counts as an abuse of executive discretion, and how best to 
try to prevent those abuses through law, extralegal norms, or politics, will 
remain among the most pressing questions at the center of constitutional 
governance in the United States. 
 
85 On Presidents’ policy motivations for managing the bureaucracy, see generally RICHARD P. 
NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983). The incentives for Presidents to turn to the 
management of administrative agencies only increase in periods of divided government and, often, 
in Presidents’ second terms. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, The Administrative President, REGBLOG (Jan. 
21, 2013), http://www.regblog.org/2013/01/21/21-coglianese-administrative-president/ [https://perma
.cc/J9R6-N2BG] (explaining why President Obama would “find the administrative process much 
more amenable to his policy goals in his second term than . . . the legislative process.”). 
